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Abstract
This paper makes use of the regional variation in schooling legislation within the German
secondary education system to estimate the causal effect of central exit examinations on
student performance. We propose a difference-in-differences framework that exploits the
quasi-experimental nature of the German TIMSS middle-school sample. The estimates show
that students in federal states with central exit examinations clearly outperform students in
other federal states, but that only part of the difference can be attributed to central exit
examinations. Our results suggest that central examinations increase student achievement by
about one third school year equivalent.
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1. Introduction 
The poor performance of German students in TIMSS and PISA  gave rise to an intense 
political discussion about the need to reform the German school system. From the perspective 
of an economist, reforms can be targeted at the allocation of financial resources or at changing 
institutions. Increasing financial resources alone appears to be no successful approach, as the 
discussion of the class size effect on achievement has demonstrated (Hanushek, 1999, Hoxby, 
2000a, Jürges and Schneider, 2003). Even if small positive effects of financial resources can 
be identified, they are very costly. 
Institutions of the schooling system, however, seem to explain more of the student 
performance. Changing the characteristics of the school system, thereby creating the right 
incentives appears to be more promising than simply allocating more financial resources to 
the education sector.
1 Competition between schools is one topic that has received attention 
(Hoxby, 2000b). Another issue, and that is the topic of this paper, are central exit 
examinations (CEEs).  
The economic literature almost unanimously shows that CEEs and hence centralised 
standards improve student performance and might even raise welfare (Costrell, 1997; Effinger 
and Polborn, 1999). It is argued that central exit examinations do better at setting the right 
incentives to students, teachers, and schools than decentralised examinations (e.g. Bishop, 
1997, 1999). Students for example benefit because results from CEEs are more valuable as 
signals on the job market than results from non-central examinations, simply because results 
are comparable. Furthermore, if an external standard is to be met at the end of the school 
career, students have no incentives to establish a low achievement cartel in class, possibly 
with the tacit consent of the teachers. Student test results can be used to monitor teacher and 
teaching quality on a regular basis. Whether incentives to improve teaching quality, an 
                                                 
1 See Jürges and Schneider (2003) for a discussion in the context of the international TIMSS database.   3
arguably important factor in the education production function, should come solely from 
reputation effects or even be in the form of better pay for better teachers is open to discussion 
(Hanushek et al, 1998). Finally, the reputation of entire schools can be based on the 
achievement of its students, with good schools attracting good students (provided that 
aggregate CEE results are publicly available). 
The empirical studies of the effect of CEEs on the academic performance of students 
claims that in cross-country as well as in single-country studies, the existence of central exit 
examinations significantly improves student performance (Bishop, 1997, 1999). The cross 
country results are obtained from using results from the international TIMSS database. 
However, as Jürges and Schneider (2003) show, the positive effect of CEEs on achievement 
in cross-country analysis based on TIMSS is not robust. Besides the international evidence, 
Bishop (1997, 1999) also presents results from Canadian micro-data. In 1990-1991 Canada 
had, just like Germany, a mixed system. Some provinces administered central exit exams at 
the final year of high school, whereas other provinces did not. Bishop estimates the effect to 
be between three fifth of a US grade-level equivalent for science and four fifth of the US 
grade level in math. 
However, it is important to separate simple correlation from causation. The possibility 
that countries or federal states with CEE place in general higher priority on education and 
achievement has to be accounted for. In that case, high average student achievement and 
CEEs only reflect the electorates preferences for good education. Earlier papers have tried to 
deal with this issue by asking whether CEE states also differ along other dimensions than 
achievement, e.g. student discipline and absenteeism (Bishop, 1997). However, the data did 
not allow a convincing identification strategy and leaves unresolved issues. 
We use the German federalised education system as a unique source of exogenous 
variation to identify the causal effect of CEEs on student achievement. Earlier studies   4
(Baumert and Watermann, 2000) have found differences at the upper secondary level for 
students in non-specialised mathematics courses only. However, as will be argued below, the 
German system of upper secondary education is not well suited to analyse the CEE effect. 
Instead we focus on the effect of exit exams at the end of lower secondary education. 
In the remainder of the paper we give a brief account of German secondary education. 
Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 discusses issues of identification and estimation. 
The results are presented in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. German secondary education in perspective 
In this section we will give a concise description of the German school system, in 
which we try to emphasise those aspects that are most relevant for the understanding of 
central exit examinations in the German context.
2 Figure 1 presents a stylised overview of 
primary and secondary education. 
Primary school – attended by all children in Germany – covers grades 1 to 4, or in 
some federal states grades 1 to 6. There is no formal exit examination at the end of primary 
school. The transition from primary school to one of the three secondary school types is 
generally guided by the students' abilities and performance. Admission to secondary school 
usually occurs on the basis of recommendations from the primary school including an 
evaluation of the student's suitability for secondary schools. If the primary school considers a 
student suitable for a certain type of school, the student will be admitted without any special 
admission procedure. In cases of conflict between the primary school's recommendations and 
the parents' wishes, the final decision about the future course of education is either with the 
parents, the receiving school or the school supervisory authority, depending on the laws of the 
federal state.   5
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Figure 1: A stylised model of the German school system 
 
Hauptschule, Realschule and Gymnasium are secondary schools offering one single 
course of education, leading to a school specific leaving certificate. The Hauptschule provides 
its students with basic general education. It normally covers grades 5 to 9 (or 10 in some 
states). The Realschule provides a more extensive general education, usually covering grades 
5 to 10. The Gymnasium provides an intensified general education. The course of education in 
the standard Gymnasium comprises both the lower and upper secondary level and usually 
covers grades 5 to 13 (or 12 in some former GDR states). Depending on academic 
performance, students can switch between school types.
3 
On completion of the lower secondary level, students in Hauptschule or Realschule 
receive a leaving certificate, provided that they have successfully completed grade 9 or 10. 
Only in some federal states students are required to pass central exit examinations (Table 1 
describes the status quo in 1995, the year the TIMSS data was collected). Students at the 
Gymnasium are not issued leaving certificates at the end of the lower secondary level, but a 
                                                                                                                                                   
2 A detailed description of the German school system can be found in Jonen and Boene (2001). 
3 A forth type of school, Gesamtschule (comprehensive school), does not appear in our figure. This type of 
secondary school offers all lower secondary level school-leaving certificates as well as the entitlement to enter 
upper secondary school. Comprehensive schools also offer upper-secondary education. It only plays a minor role 
in most federal states. Less than 10 percent of all students in grade 8 are in a comprehensive school.   6
qualification to attend the upper level of the Gymnasium. Students leaving Hauptschule and 
Realschule usually undergo vocational training in the so-called dual system. The system is 
called dual because students are trained in parallel at the workplace (a private or public sector 
employer) and in a vocational school. 
Table 1: CEE by federal state and type of degree; proportion of students by school/degree type (as of 1995) 















Baden-Württemberg (BW)  G/M/F/O  G/M/F  A  71.8  71.6 
Bavaria (BY)  G/M/F/S*/O  G/M/F/S*/O  A  73.2  73.1 
Berlin (BE)        67.2  57.2 
Brandenburg (BB)        71.7  54.8 
Bremen (HB)        69.1  63.9 
Hamburg (HH)        65.6  56.7 
Hesse (HE)        67.2  61.4 
Mecklenburg-W. Pomerania (MV)    G/M/F  A  72.2  70.7 
Lower Saxony (NI)        73.2  72.0 
North Rhine-Westphalia (NW)        69.6  64.7 
Rhineland-Palatinate (RP)        72.0  70.5 
Saarland (SA)      A  71.8  66.0 
Saxony (SN)  G/M/F  G/M/S  A  69.9  69.9 
Saxony-Anhalt (ST)    G/M  A  67.6  67.2 
Schleswig-Holstein (SH)        73.7  71.5 
Thuringia (TH)  G/M  G/M/F  A  67.7  67.4 
G = German; M = Mathematics; F = Foreign Language (mostly English); S = Science; O = Other; A = Any subject chosen 
for the written exams; *subject to student choice; ** Students in 8
th grade Haupt- and Realschule plus two thirds of all 
students in 8
th grade comprehensive school. 
 
Central exit examinations are most common at the end of upper-secondary education. 
In 1995, seven out of the sixteen German federal states had a central Abitur (high-school 
diploma) on the state level. These states are concentrated in the south (Baden-Württemberg, 
Bavaria, Saarland) and east (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, 
Thuringia). The other states had decentralised systems, where teachers design problems for 
exit examinations individually subject to the approval of the school supervisory authority. Six 
states have central exit examinations at the end of Realschule and only four have them at the 
end of Hauptschule. 
German exit examinations never cover all subjects taught at school. At the Abitur 
level, students can choose three or four subjects (within certain limits that vary by federal   7
state). This leads to difficult self-selection problems, which are unlikely to be solved 
convincingly with the available TIMSS data. At Realschule and Hauptschule, German and 
mathematics are always part of the exit examinations, i.e., mathematics is compulsory for all 
students passing exit examinations in these two school types. In order to assess the effect of 
CEEs on student achievement, we will thus concentrate on mathematics performance in 
Hauptschule and Realschule as the main outcome variable thought to be affected by CEEs. 
Other subjects in central exit examinations are languages (mostly English) or – less common 
– science. 
 
3. Data description 
The international data set of TIMSS Germany contains data on a total of 5763 students 
from 7
th and 8
th grade in 137 schools, collected in the 1994/95 school year. Students are from 
14 out of 16 German federal states (Baden-Württemberg and Bremen did not participate), and 
we have data from all major types of secondary schools: Hauptschule, Realschule, 
Gymnasium, and Gesamtschule. However, for reasons explained below we only use data from 
students in  Haupt- and Realschule. In addition to the actual test results in mathematics and 
science, TIMSS data contains a wide range of background variables on student background 
and attitudes, and teacher and school background. Despite the richness of the available data, 
we will follow a rather parsimonious approach and select a limited number of control 
variables for student and school background that have proven to have sizeable explanatory 
power for student achievement. 
Table 2 contains variable definitions and descriptive statistics by type of exit 
examination. Note that we use sampling weights throughout the entire paper. In contrast to 
publications with focus on international comparisons of student achievement, we do not take 
the international standardised math (and in some analyses) science scores as dependent   8
variables. For sake of intra-German comparability we chose the national Rasch scores, 
standardised to have mean zero and variance one. The size of our regression parameters are 
thus directly interpretable in terms of standard deviations. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (weighted) 
  non-CEE  CEE 
Variable  Mean  StdDev  Mean  StdDev 
Mathematics score  -0.134  0.943  0.213  0.971 
Science score  -0.114  0.966  0.216  0.969 
Sex (1 = girl)  0.486    0.459   
Books at home: 0-10  0.183    0.188   
Books at home: 11-25  0.291    0.333   
Books at home: 26-100  0.168    0.175   
Books at home: 101-200  0.234    0.209   
Books at home: 200+  0.123    0.096   
Immigrant child (both parents born abroad)  0.191    0.077   
School type (1 = Realschule)  0.522    0.541   
Grade (1 = 8
th grade)  0.498    0.478   
Repeated class at least once  0.359    0.246   
Science at home=0 hours/day   0.174    0.203   
Science at home<1 hours/day   0.639    0.626   
Science at home=1-2 hours/day*   0.173    0.157   
Science at home=3-5 hours/day   0.010    0.012   
Science at home>5 hours/day   0.005    0.022   
East Germany  0.042    0.455   
Cumulative math lessons (in 1000s)  1.198  0.121  1.292  0.105 
N obs.  1834  1363 
* response categories did not cover 2-3 hours 
 
The most notable difference between students with and without central exit 
examinations is in terms of achievement, both in math and science. Those with central exams 
score on average one half standard deviation higher than those without. Student background, 
measured by the number of books at home differs only slightly. The proportion of students 
within each range are quite the same in CEE and non-CEE states. Immigrant children are 
more frequent in the non-CEE group than in the CEE group. This is to be explained mainly by 
the fact that immigrants are relatively rare in East Germany, where most federal states have 
central exit examinations (a heritage of the former GDR education system). Another 
interesting fact is that  the cumulative number of math lessons – calculated from official time 
tables of all federal states (Frenck 2001) – is considerably smaller for students in non-CEE 
states.   9
 
4. Identification and Estimation 
Using German TIMSS data, the most basic approach to identify the causal effect of 
CEE on student achievement would seem to estimate simple differences between average 
achievement in CEE states and non-CEE states, controlling for student background and other 
variables of interest, e.g. the total time devoted to math and science education. By total time, 
we do not only mean hours in the current school year but hours accumulated over all school 
years up to the examination period. Simple differences have only limited value because they 
ignore two potentially confounding effects: endogeneity of CEEs and a composition effect. 
The composition effect stems from the fact that CEE states have on average more students in 
Haupt- and Realschule and less students in Gymnasium than non-CEE states. Since students 
are selected into secondary schools mainly on the basis of achievement in primary school, this 
fact gives rise to the interesting effect that student achievement in CEE states (conditional on 
school type) will be higher simply by having on average relatively more able students in each 
type of school. We will use information on the proportion of students in each school type to 
account for this kind of composition effect. Different student compositions in German 
secondary schools across federal states are interpreted as the result of different ability 
cutpoints a chosen to separate students. As a proxy for a, we will use  ) 1 (
1 a - F
- , the a 
percent quantile of the standard normal distribution, where a is the proportion of 8
th grade 
students heading for a high school diploma. 
Self-selection into treatment is one of the most frequent problems when researchers try 
to evaluate causal effects of certain policy measures. Although it cannot be ruled out 
completely that parents vote with their feet and move between federal states in order to send 
their children to schools with a central exit examination, this seems rather unlikely. We 
therefore assume that the treatment status is exogenous given the institutional arrangement in   10
each federal state. However, in the long run institutions can change. The existence of CEEs 
might reflect unobserved variables such as of the electorate's priority on education, that is 
parental attitudes towards education and achievement in school. When CEEs are correlated 
with such attitudes, simple differences between CEE and non-CEE states are a biased measure 
of the CEE effect. 
To isolate CEE effects from differential parental attitudes or other unobserved 
variables, our strategy is to exploit further variation within states. For instance, a typical CEE 
state has central examinations for each type of leaving certificate (Haupt-, 
Realschulabschluss, Abitur), a typical non-CEE state has no central examinations at all. Some 
states, however, have mixed systems. In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Hauptschule 
exams are not central, but Realschule exams and Abitur are. In Saarland, only Abitur was a 
CEE (since 2001/2002 all exams are central). This variation in institutional settings can be 
used in the sense that those in non-CEE schools living in CEE states can be used as a control 
group. Unfortunately, there are two problems with this estimation strategy. First, as 
mentioned before, the allocation of students to school types is not random but rather on the 
basis of prior academic achievement, which in turn might be correlated with unobservable but 
relevant variables, such as susceptibility to extrinsic motivation of all kind. It is therefore 
desirable to take selection into school types into account. The second and more important 
problem is lack of data: the "interesting" states such as Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and 
Saarland are small and there are not many observations from both states in the sample. 
 A further possibility to evaluate the effectiveness of central exit examinations are 
before-after comparisons. Fuelled by a heated public discussion after the publication of 
TIMSS and in particular the PISA study, some states have newly introduced CEEs or are 
planning to introduce them. Quite interestingly, no federal state actually has plans to abolish 
CEEs. Since PISA is designed as a repeated cross-section, this data could be used to estimate   11
the effect of these policy changes. In this framework, the causal effect of CEEs will still be 
difficult to identify because there might also have been other policy changes as a response to 
TIMSS/PISA. The publication of the test results might have changed parental attitudes 
towards education, etc. Since we have only one cross-section of data, we mention this 
possibility mainly for sake of completeness.
4  
Fortunately, the German secondary education system offers a unique source of 
exogenous variation that can be used to identify the causal effect of CEEs on student 
achievement. Table 1 shows not only which federal states have CEEs in which types of 
schools, but also which subjects are covered. Note that in Haupt- and Realschule, central exit 
examinations (if any) cover only German, mathematics, and one foreign language (mostly 
English). Science is not tested in central examinations – with two exceptions. For Saxony's 
Realschule degree, science is a compulsory subject. In Bavaria, science is optional. Each year, 
roughly 40 percent of all students aiming at a Hauptschule degree are tested in biology, 
chemistry and physics, i.e. all subjects covered by the TIMSS science test. Between 20 and 25 
percent of those aiming at the Realschule degree actually have written exit examinations in 
physics only, which accounts for roughly one third of the TIMSS science items. If 
mathematics is a subject in central examinations and science is not, the effect of CEEs on 
student achievement should be larger in math than in science classes. Since TIMSS provides 
test results both in math and in science, we can estimate difference-in-differences by subject. 
The main advantage of this estimator is that with the available data (math and science results 
for one and the same student) each individual serves as his/her own control group. By 
accounting for the correlation between both measures on the individual level, we are able to 
                                                 
4 Wößmann (2002) uses the international TIMSS data set to estimate difference-in-differences by grade, arguing 
that incentives should increase as the exit exams approach. His regressions suggest that the end of upper 
secondary CEE effect increases by about 50% when students move from grade 7 to 8. We have two objections 
against this approach. First, we simply believe that this estimates is too large to be believed in (as a simple 
thought experiment, extrapolate this effect to the final school year). Second, how incentives increase as one 
approaches the final exam is an interesting question in its own right and would have to be studied in a dynamic   12
control for individual heterogeneity, for instance general ability or parental background.
5 Of 
course, in order to interpret this difference as the causal effect of CEEs on student 
performance, one still needs identifying assumptions. First, there must be no systematic 
indirect effects in the form of spill-over from mathematics to science.
6 Second, CEE and non-
CEE states must not differ systematically in their relative preference of maths over science. 
Third, mathematics and science test results must be measured on the same scale, i.e., they 
must be comparable. 
There will be positive spill-over from math to science if good math skills are a 
prerequisite for performing well in science, or – to be more precise – in TIMSS science items. 
In this case the difference-in-differences by subject framework will underestimate the effect 
of CEEs on achievement. However, we believe that spill-over from good maths education to 
good performance in the TIMSS science test is likely to be very small. In order to assess the 
likelihood of such spill-over, we analysed the (released) set of TIMSS science items (IEA 
TIMSS 1998). The released set contains 87 items of which only four require quite basic 
mathematics skills, such as dividing by a fraction (see Appendix). 
One can also think of some kind of negative spill-over from math to science if students 
divert resources away from learning science to learning maths because the latter is tested 
against an external and thus higher standard (displacement effect). This is what a simple 
model of time allocation between learning mathematics, learning science, and leisure would 
predict, reflecting the incentives that are actually intended when introducing central exams. 
Given this displacement effect the difference-in-differences by subject framework will 
overestimate the effect of a general introduction of CEEs. Strictly speaking, we are only able 
to measure the size effect of a partial introduction of CEEs unless we can keep constant all 
                                                                                                                                                   
optimisation framework. Without such a model it remains unclear at which rate relative performance will 
increase from year to year. 
5 One remaining source of heterogeneity are of course relative innate math versus science skills.   13
inputs invested in learning science. These inputs are only partly observable, e.g. as the 
students' self-reported hours of studying science outside school. Below, we will make 
tentative use of this data although we believe that the results must be interpreted with caution. 
First, the quality of these self-reports is at best unclear and second, studying at home itself 
could be endogenous provided less than average performing students need more hours to do 
their homework than brighter ones. 
The second identifying assumption is that relative preferences are the same in both 
types of states. The fact that most CEE-states test mathematics but not science in exit 
examinations indicates that mathematics skills are generally more valued than science skills. 
It does not allow to conclude that the relative preference is stronger in CEE states than in 
others. Mathematics appears to be a core subject in every state, accounting for roughly one 
fifth of official teaching time in primary schools and about one seventh of official teaching 
time in lower secondary schools. However, between CEE and non-CEE states, there are no 
significant differences in relative teaching time. In CEE states, the proportion of math lessons 
among all lessons is 14.3 and 13.7 percent in Hauptschule and Realschule, respectively. In 
non-CEE states, the corresponding figures are 14.6 and 13.7 percent, i.e. the average 
percentage of math lessons is even slightly higher (Frenck 2001). 
According to the complementary evidence presented above, the identifying 
assumptions of our difference-in-differences by subject framework appear to be plausible. 
Still, one potential problem remains to be discussed: Since exit examinations in Saxony 
generally comprise maths and science, we exclude these cases from this part of our analysis. 
(Alternatively, Saxony can be treated as a non-CEE state, which leads only to minor changes 
in our results). Between 25 and 40 percent of all students in Bavaria have central exit 
examinations in science. Although it seems reasonable to assume that those who are good in 
                                                                                                                                                   
6 We do not consider science to math spill-overs, since we do not expect any effect of specific knowledge and 
skills (science) to more general skills (mathematics).   14
science will choose science as a topic for their exit examination, we are not able to tell for 
sure who will eventually do which kind of exam. One possibility to deal with this problem is 
to discard all students from Bavaria from our regression. However, we are reluctant to do so 
for two reasons: First, Bavaria has the largest sample size among all CEE states, accounting 
for about 60 percent of all CEE observations. Second, if Bavaria is discarded from the data, 
all remaining CEE states are in East Germany. Since four out of five federal states in East 
Germany have CEEs, eliminating Bavaria from our sample would make it impossible to 
distinguish the CEE effect from a "former GDR" effect. This is important because schools in 
the former GDR appear to have a slightly different tradition in the way science is taught than 
the rest of Germany.
7 
Estimates of the CEE effect in our difference-in-differences by subject framework will 
of course be affected when some of the students in our sample will eventually have to pass 
CEEs in science, but this will bias our estimates downwards. We are therefore able to give 
some kind of lower bound for the causal effect of CEEs. However, we will also provide a 
simple robustness check by discarding those Bavarian students from the sample that are most 
likely to choose science as a subject of their exit examination. These are students in 
Hauptschule who strongly agree to the statement that they "usually do well" in biology and/or 
physical science (chemistry/physics), and students in Realschule who strongly agree to the 
statement that they "usually do well" in physical science. Since using the full sample of 
Bavarian students gives us a lower bound of the CEE effect, we expect larger effects when we 
exclude those doing well in science. 
The third assumption needed to interpret the difference-in-differences by subject as the 
size effect of CEEs is that mathematics and science achievement in TIMSS are measured on 
the same scale and that calculating the difference is thus feasible. Below, we have examined 
                                                 
7 Recent analyses from PISA show that students in East Germany perform significantly better when given a 
specific national science item set than when given the international science items. In West Germany, no such   15
the robustness of our estimates against violations of this assumption by converting the 




Our estimation results are listed in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3, column (1) contains an 
estimate for the simple difference in maths achievement between students with and without a 
central exit examination in mathematics. The difference is as large as .472 standard 
deviations, more than the equivalent of an entire school year (.372 standard deviations). Note 
that this difference is already estimated net of any student background and composition 
effects. Bishop (1997) reports the CEE effect to be only about one-half of a US grade-level 
equivalent when comparing Canadian provinces with and without CEEs. 
All our background variables have the expected effects on the students' math scores. Since 
they have been selected on the basis of primary school achievement, Realschule students 
perform much better than those in Hauptschule. The number of books at home is used as a 
proxy for the intellectual background of the parents, which usually has much better 
explanatory power for and stronger impact on children's achievement than formal education. 
In fact, the difference between those with less than ten books at home and those with more 
than 200 is larger than one school year. Immigrant children perform slightly worse than 
others, those who already have repeated a class are also doing less well, girls perform on 
average worse than boys, and East German students perform worse than West Germans.
8 
The correlation between central exit examination and student achievement reported in 
column (1) could well be driven by unobservables that are correlated with CEEs. In order to 
                                                                                                                                                   
difference can be observed (Baumert et al. 2002). 






Table 3: Central exit examinations effects on student achievement in mathematics 
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  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
CEE  0.472  0.123  0.139  0.174  0.189 
  (6.78)**  (2.93)**  (3.38)**  (3.87)**  (4.31)** 
Grade  0.372  -0.005  -0.021  -0.002  -0.019 
  (4.27)**  (0.14)  (0.55)  (0.06)  (0.47) 
Alpha  2.131         
  (3.47)**         
Realschule  0.715  0.138  0.150  0.116  0.128 
  (12.88)**  (3.27)**  (3.51)**  (2.70)**  (2.94)** 
11-25 books  0.129  -0.116  -0.129  -0.122  -0.134 
  (2.25)*  (2.10)*  (2.39)*  (2.11)*  (2.40)* 
26-100 books  0.293  -0.132  -0.139  -0.112  -0.115 
  (4.82)**  (2.25)*  (2.41)*  (1.85)  (1.95) 
101-200 books  0.384  -0.132  -0.127  -0.129  -0.120 
  (5.97)**  (2.00)*  (1.98)*  (1.87)  (1.80) 
200+ books  0.446  -0.160  -0.181  -0.137  -0.157 
  (7.69)**  (2.72)**  (3.10)**  (2.31)*  (2.68)** 
Immigrant child  -0.142  0.275  0.291  0.294  0.313 
  (2.47)*  (4.92)**  (5.12)**  (5.17)**  (5.45)** 
Repeated class  -0.130  -0.066  -0.065  -0.065  -0.063 
  (3.32)**  (1.68)  (1.63)  (1.58)  (1.50) 
Girl  -0.264  0.090  0.102  0.091  0.104 
  (7.00)**  (2.58)*  (2.82)**  (2.57)*  (2.77)** 
East  -0.489  -0.294  -0.305  -0.342  -0.350 
  (4.63)**  (3.68)**  (3.69)**  (4.16)**  (4.14)** 
Cum. math lessons  -0.410         
  (0.96)         
Relative cum. math lessons    0.590  0.471  0.926  0.787 
    (0.60)  (0.47)  (0.95)  (0.79) 
Science at home<1 hour/day      -0.048    -0.048 
      (0.86)    (0.81) 
Science at home=1-2 hours/day      0.035    -0.015 
      (0.34)    (0.14) 
Science at home=3-5 hours/day      -0.026    -0.027 
      (0.64)    (0.63) 
Science at home>5 hours/day      0.707    0.691 
      (2.89)**    (2.80)** 
Constant  -1.404  -0.176  -0.129  -0.261  -0.211 
  (3.10)**  (0.71)  (0.51)  (1.08)  (0.85) 
Observations  3197  2995  2909  2727  2644 
R-squared  0.35  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.05 
Robust t-statistics (accounting for clustering on the class level) in parentheses; 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level; 
a dependent variable: math score; 
b dependent variable: 
math score -science score; 
c excluding Bavarian students who claim being good in science 
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disentangle this correlation from causation, we now turn to our difference-in-differences by 
subject estimates.  
As argued before, the main advantage of this estimator is that every student serves as 
his or her own control group, being examined centrally in mathematics but not in science. We 
have implemented this estimator by simply calculating each individual's difference between 
his/her math and his/her science score and regressing this difference on a set of explanatory 
variables. In contrast to "levels"-regression in column (1) we use the ratio between cumulative 
math lessons and a proxy for science lessons instead of the number of math lessons.
9 The 
estimates are listed in column (2) of Table 3. The first thing to note is that the coefficient for 
CEE remains positive and significant. However, it drops from .472 standard deviations in the 
simple differences estimator to .123 standard deviations, or one third school year equivalent. 
Students in CEE states show better relative performance in mathematics than in science. This 
is consistent with the claim that CEEs improve student performance. When Bavarian students 
with great interest in science (and who are thus likely to choose a central exit examination in 
science) are eliminated from the sample, the estimate for the CEE effect increases (column 
(4)). This is in line with our expectations because we take out students whose relative 
performance is less likely to be affected by CEEs than the average. 
The rationale to control for the students' amount of time spent on learning science at 
home (columns (3) and (5)) is to eliminate possible displacement effects from our estimates. 
If we keep inputs into learning science constant, the estimated effect of CEEs on the 
difference between math and science achievement can be interpreted as the effect of a general 
introduction of CEEs. Otherwise we are only able to identify the effect of a partial 
introduction, namely in mathematics and German. Contrary to our expectations, controlling   18
for the time spent on learning science at home slightly increases our estimate of the CEE 
effect and the number of hours itself has no effect on the math-science score differential 
(unless if learning science longer than incredible 5 hours per day). As we already mentioned 
these results have to be treated with caution, given the fact that this is self-reported data and 
the potential endogeneity of the variable itself. 
While the focus is clearly on the CEE variable, other parameter estimates in columns 
(2) to (5) are worth noting. The Realschule dummy is positive and significant, hence students 
at Realschule perform relatively better in math than in science. The book variables are 
negative and slightly increasing in magnitude with the number of books at home. Thus 
students from better educated households perform relatively better in science. Children with 
an immigration background are relatively better math students, which might be due to an 
insufficient command of German, which is less important for  maths than for  science. 
Table 4 replicates the regressions in Table 3, taking exact percentiles as the dependent 
variable. For example, the CEE coefficient of 0.135 in column (1) indicates that the average 
student from a CEE state represents a percentile of the common math score distribution that is 
13.5 percentage points above that of the average non-CEE student. The coefficient of 0.035 in 
column (2) shows that the rank differential between math and science is 3.5 percentage points 
larger in CEE states than the same rank differential in non-CEE states. Note that this is again 
in the range of about one third grade year which accounts for 9.9 percentage points in the 
math distribution. Note also that the percentile regressions are less sensitive to the 
introduction of "science hours at home" to control for a potential displacement effect. To 
summarize, the conversion of the national Rasch scores into exact quantiles and using 
differences therein as dependent variables does change the quantitative nature of our results 
only slightly, supporting our claim that CEEs improve student achievement. 
                                                                                                                                                   
9 This proxy is total lessons minus math lessons minus German lessons. Separate information on science lessons 
was not available.   19
 
 
Table 4: Central exit examinations effects on student achievement in mathematics (percentile effects) 






b  diff-in-diffs I






  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
CEE  0.135  0.035  0.035  0.050  0.050 
  (6.80)**  (2.83)**  (2.89)**  (3.80)**  (3.85)** 
Grade  0.099  -0.010  -0.011  -0.009  -0.010 
  (3.70)**  (0.90)  (0.96)  (0.73)  (0.80) 
Alpha  0.602         
  (3.26)**         
Realschule  0.217  0.044  0.044  0.038  0.038 
  (12.65)**  (3.31)**  (3.32)**  (2.81)**  (2.82)** 
11-25 books  0.034  -0.036  -0.035  -0.037  -0.037 
  (1.94)  (2.27)*  (2.20)*  (2.28)*  (2.21)* 
26-100 books  0.082  -0.037  -0.037  -0.033  -0.033 
  (4.58)**  (2.20)*  (2.19)*  (1.88)  (1.88) 
101-200 books  0.121  -0.025  -0.025  -0.023  -0.023 
  (6.19)**  (1.29)  (1.28)  (1.16)  (1.15) 
200+ books  0.129  -0.046  -0.047  -0.036  -0.038 
  (7.18)**  (2.64)**  (2.73)**  (2.15)*  (2.24)* 
Immigrant child  -0.030  0.081  0.078  0.087  0.084 
  (1.62)  (4.86)**  (4.57)**  (5.17)**  (4.92)** 
Repeated class  -0.040  -0.024  -0.023  -0.021  -0.020 
  (3.42)**  (1.91)  (1.84)  (1.63)  (1.54) 
Girl  -0.080  0.031  0.032  0.031  0.033 
  (6.72)**  (2.77)**  (2.83)**  (2.73)**  (2.81)** 
East  -0.153  -0.097  -0.099  -0.111  -0.113 
  (4.81)**  (3.47)**  (3.57)**  (3.83)**  (3.93)** 
Cum. math lessons  -0.083         
  (0.65)         
Relative cum. math lessons    0.301  0.329  0.382  0.411 
    (0.91)  (1.00)  (1.14)  (1.23) 
Science at home<1 hour/day      -0.000    -0.002 
      (0.01)    (0.09) 
Science at home=1-2 hours/day      0.034    0.023 
      (1.06)    (0.72) 
Science at home=3-5 hours/day      -0.002    -0.001 
      (0.17)    (0.11) 
Science at home>5 hours/day      0.197    0.194 
      (3.16)**    (2.97)** 
Constant  0.048  -0.084  -0.091  -0.109  -0.116 
  (0.34)  (1.03)  (1.10)  (1.33)  (1.40) 
Observations  2982  2791  2791  2539  2539 
R-squared  0.34  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.05 
Robust t-statistics (accounting for clustering on the class level) in parentheses; 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level; 
a dependent variable: math score percentile; 
b dependent 
variable: math score percentile-science score percentile; 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper discusses the benefits of central exit examinations (CEEs) for academic 
achievement at lower secondary education. Theoretically, the benefits from central 
examinations are at hand. However, it is not straightforward to identify the causal effect of 
CEEs empirically. Unlike earlier studies, we make use of institutional variation in Germany 
that allows us to develop an identification strategy to estimate the causal effect of CEEs on 
academic performance. In Germany's school system, only some states have CEEs, mostly in 
the core subjects German and Mathematics. We use data from the Third International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and  exploit this institutional variation to uncover 
the causal effect of CEEs on student achievement in mathematics. Several possible 
identification strategies, all difference-in-differences estimators, are discussed. 
Comparing simple test results, students in German CEE states clearly outperform 
those in non-CEE states (by approximately  0.5 standard deviations or one and a quarter grade 
years). However, this also applies to a somewhat lesser extent to subjects that are not tested in 
central examinations, such as science. We propose a difference-in-differences estimator that 
interprets the difference in math and science achievement in TIMSS in CEE states compared 
to the same difference in non-CEE states as the causal effect of central examinations on 
achievement. Under the assumption of no spill-over effects and identical relative preferences 
between math and science, the average causal effect of CEE on math achievement is 
estimated to be about 0.12 standard deviations or one third grade year. 
The difference between the raw difference between states with and without CEEs and 
what we identify as the causal effect of CEEs is fairly sizable. Thus caution is warranted when 
interpreting observed differences between states with or without CEEs as the effect of CEEs 
on student achievement. Much (but not all) of the correlation between CEEs and student   21
performance seems to be driven by general preferences for education in the German federal 
states. 
Still, our empirical findings suggest that the introduction of central exit examinations 
will raise average student achievement significantly. Although the estimated increase will not 
completely level out raw differences between states with and without CEEs, policy makers in 
German federal states should seriously consider CEEs in order to provide students and 
teachers in their states with incentives to adhere to higher standards. Compared to other 
measures discussed to raise student achievement such as decreasing class sizes, central exit 
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Appendix: TIMSS population 2 Science items involving math skills 
 
L4 – Machine A and Machine B are each used to clear a field. The table shows how large an area each cleared in 
1 hour and how much gasoline each used. 
 
  Area of field cleared in 1 hour  Gasoline used in 1 hour 
Machine A  2 hectares  3/4 liter 
Machine B  1 hectare  1/2 liter 
 
Which machine is more efficient in converting the energy in gasoline to work? Explain your answer. 
 
 
M12 – Some students used an ammeter A to measure the current in the circuit for different voltages. 
 
 
The table shows some of the results. Complete the table. 
 
Voltage (volts)  Current (milliamperes) 
1.5  10 
3.0  20 
6.0   
 
 




If the ant keeps moving at the same speed, how far will it have traveled at the end of 30 seconds? 
A. 5 cm 
B. 6 cm 
C. 20 cm 
D. 30 cm  
 
 
Z1 – It takes 10 painters 2 years to paint a steel bridge from one end to the other. The paint that is used lasts 
about 2 years, so when the painters have finished painting at one end of the bridge, they go back to the other end 
and start painting again. 
a. Why MUST steel bridges be painted? 
b. A new paint that lasts 4 years has been developed and costs the same as the old paint. Describe 2 
consequences of using the new paint. CESifo Working Paper Series
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